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Rethinking Article III Standing in Class 
Action Consumer Protection Cases 
Following Spokeo v. Robins 
Joshua Scott Olin* 
The Supreme Court recently handed down the landmark decision 
of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, holding that a “bare procedural 
violation” of a federal consumer protection statute—namely, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act—was not enough to satisfy Article III 
standing because the injury alleged was particularized but not 
concrete. After Spokeo, those wishing to bring suit based on 
consumer protection statutes will have a much more difficult time 
showing that the injury suffered was “concrete” enough to confer 
Article III standing and, as a result, the term “consumer 
protection” will be rendered meaningless. Unless the Supreme 
Court revisits the issue presented in Spokeo, the lack of clarity 
given by the Spokeo Court in determining whether an injury is 
concrete will leave consumers without the necessary means to 
ensure that the consumer protection statutes actually protect 
them. 
In Spokeo, the Plaintiff, Thomas Robins, on behalf of himself and 
others similarly situated, had false information disseminated 
about him by Spokeo in a “consumer report,” in violation of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Court correctly stated that 
“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms 
does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury–
in–fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person to sue to 
                                                                                                         
 *  Juris Doctor Candidate 2018, University of Miami School of Law; Editor–in–Chief, 
Volume 26, University of Miami Business Law Review. Thank you to both the Executive 
and Editorial Boards of the University of Miami Business Law Review for all of their hard 
work and a special thank you for my Faculty Advisor, Professor Peter Nemerovski, for all 
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the writing process. 
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vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete injury 
even in the context of a statutory violation.” However, as Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent states, “[j]udged by what we have said about 
‘concreteness,’ Robins’ allegations carry him across the 
threshold.” Where the Court argues that a bare procedural 
violation, such as “an incorrect zip code,” is not enough, Justice 
Ginsburg points out that the misinformation disseminated about 
Robins could affect his ability to obtain a job, and therefore, the 
injury was concrete. 
Because of this decision, plaintiffs now wishing to bring suit based 
on federal consumer protection statutes will, on the pleadings, be 
subjected to a much higher level of scrutiny. Accordingly, 
“consumer protection” loses much of its meaning because Spokeo 
protects business interests more than consumer interests. This 
note argues that the Spokeo decision will negatively impact 
consumers moving forward and that the issue of when an injury is 
“concrete” must be revisited, sooner rather than later, if 
consumer protection is to survive. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Take a moment to think about a time when someone else’s 
wrongdoing caused you to suffer an injury. Maybe it was a physical one, 
an emotional one, or even one that had a significant financial impact. If 
the injury was significant, you would likely file a lawsuit against whoever 
wronged you. Before the suit could proceed, the requirements of Article 
III must be satisfied. The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to 
require that plaintiffs have standing to have their case heard in a court of 
law.1 For standing to exist, the plaintiff must point to an injury sustained 
as a result of a defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and the injury must 
be redressable.2 Plaintiffs must also show that they have suffered an injury 
in fact, “i.e., a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of 
a legally protected interest.”3 Without meeting these Article III 
requirements, your lawsuit will not proceed past the pleadings stage. 
The court, however, may view what you believe to be a real injury as 
insufficient to rise to the level of concreteness and particularity mandated 
by Article III. When it comes to consumer protection and sensitive data, 
this is particularly troubling. Imagine you signed up for a web service or 
decided to do some shopping online and the website you are on asks you 
to store personal information such as your credit card number, address, 
password, email address, etc., on the website’s “secure server.” Now, say 
you know you will be using this web service again in the future, so you 
agree to store your information to experience a quicker, more convenient 
checkout upon your next visit. A few weeks later, all of your data is stolen 
by hackers who managed to breach the network where your information 
was stored. You are worried that the hackers will be able to use your credit 
card number and personal information to either steal your identity or make 
purchases on your behalf. As a result, you and a class of other similarly 
situated plaintiffs decide to file a class action against the company that 
failed to protect your information. 
The company your information is now stored with argues that you 
have not suffered a “concrete” injury, because you have not actually been 
subject to any form of harm. However, because of the data breach, hackers 
now possess your private information and can do with it what they please. 
Is this type of lawsuit something that our court system should allow? 
Should our court system allow litigation to proceed where a plaintiff, 
especially in the consumer protection context, exhibits an injury that 
                                                                                                         
1 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (whether the plaintiff has established an 
actual case or controversy between himself and the defendant within the confines of Art. 
III is the threshold question when determining if a federal court can entertain the suit). 
2 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992). 
3 Id. at 555. 
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would ordinarily suffice for Article III standing? The ordinary consumer 
expects that, should a company cause him or her harm, he or she can 
receive compensation through the courts. 
This note will focus on what it means for an injury to be “concrete” in 
consumer protection cases, many of which are, by nature, class actions. 
After the recent Supreme Court decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,4 it is 
not the definition of a “concrete” injury that is unclear but rather the 
threshold a plaintiff must cross in order for the injury to be sufficiently 
concrete for standing to exist. This note will argue that Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Spokeo provides a better approach to Article III standing in 
consumer protection cases.5 
Part I of this note introduces Spokeo and posits the resulting 
disconnect that Article III standing has in consumer protection class 
actions. Part II discusses Spokeo in depth. Part III focuses on Article III 
and analyzes Congress’ intentions behind the standing doctrine, the 
development of the “concrete” injury requirement, Article III standing in 
the class action setting, and how procedural violations fit into the standing 
doctrine. Part IV analyzes Spokeo in relation to consumer protection cases 
and analyzes how other courts have already applied Spokeo, ending with 
a discussion of the newly handed down Ninth Circuit opinion. Finally, Part 
V posits potential ways for future plaintiffs to bypass the incredibly 
difficult standard Spokeo created. 
II. SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS 
As of May 2016, consumers who wish to file a complaint stemming 
from federal statutory violations, such as a violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), must overcome a new, major hurdle created by the 
Supreme Court in Spokeo. Because of the decision in Spokeo, plaintiffs 
who seek to bring suit in consumer protection and privacy cases must meet 
an increasingly difficult standard of standing under Article III, specifically 
in satisfying the “concreteness” prong of “injury in fact.” 
Spokeo, Inc. advertises itself as “a people search engine that organizes 
white pages listings, public records and social network information into 
simple profiles to help . . . safely find and learn about people.”6 Thomas 
Robins is a resident of Vienna, Virginia. He initially filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California in 2010, alleging 
                                                                                                         
4 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
5 As this note was near the completion of its editorial cycle for publication, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled on Spokeo on remand from the Supreme Court. For a discussion of the Ninth 
Circuit decision, see infra Part IV, Section H. 
6 SPOKEO, http://www.spokeo.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
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a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which is a consumer 
protection statute designed to prevent false reporting of consumer credit 
information.7 At the time the complaint was filed, Robins ascertained that 
the information contained in the consumer report generated by Spokeo 
correctly described his basic identifying information but most everything 
else about him was incorrect.8 
Spokeo went far beyond its mission statement when it falsely reported 
Robins’ credentials. Robins alleged, and proved, that Spokeo incorrectly 
reported that Robins “was in his 50s, married, employed in a professional 
or technical field, and had children.”9 Furthermore, Robins found that what 
Spokeo claimed to be an image of Robins was not in fact Robins.10 At the 
time Robins filed suit, he was out of work and actively seeking 
employment, but was concerned that the inaccuracies listed in Spokeo’s 
consumer report about him were affecting his ability to obtain not only a 
job, but credit, insurance, and the like.11 
Initially, the district court denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss Robins’ 
amended complaint for lack of Article III standing, but after Spokeo 
sought interlocutory appeal, the district court reconsidered its previous 
ruling and granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss.12 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, holding that Spokeo’s alleged violations of Robins’ 
rights under the FCRA did in fact confer standing upon Robins because 
even though Congress’ power to confer standing has limits, in this 
particular case, the interests protected by a statutory right were sufficiently 
concrete and particularized to be elevated by Congress.13 That elevation, 
coupled with the fact that Robins alleged that his statutory rights were 
violated, and not just the rights of other people, was enough to show that 
Robins’ personal interest to have his credit information properly handled 
was “individualized rather than collective.”14 
In Spokeo, Robins sued under the FCRA, a federal statute that aims to 
protect consumers.15 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is responsible 
for enforcing many of the consumer protection statutes that exist, 
                                                                                                         
7 Complaint, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 10–5306). 
8 Id. at 5 (Basic information contains information such as Robins’ address, 
neighborhood, and siblings’ names.). 
9 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1554. 
10 Id. 
11 Complaint, supra note 7, at 5. 
12 Brief of Respondent at 9, Spokeo v. Robins, 136 U.S. 1540 (2016) (No. 13–1339), 
2015 WL 5169094. 
13 See id. at 9–10. 
14 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 
15 See id. at 1542–43. 
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including the FCRA.16 Under the Act, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in 
her dissent, “Congress granted adversely affected consumers a right to sue 
noncomplying reporting agencies.”17 The purpose of the FCRA is to 
ensure that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures in 
regards to meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, 
insurance, and other information in such a way that is fair and equitable to 
the consumer, especially regarding the confidentiality, accuracy, 
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.18 Accordingly, 
Congress clearly intended for there to be redressability for those 
consumers who fall victim to a violation of the FCRA. Indeed, the FCRA 
is intended to protect consumers against inaccurate reporting. 
The Court in Spokeo, however, failed to decide whether a concrete 
injury existed. Rather, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit conducted an 
incomplete analysis by failing to focus on the “concrete” injury prong and 
only analyzing the “particularized” prong.19 In remanding back to the 
Ninth Circuit, the Court tiptoed around what it means for an injury to be 
“concrete” and gave minimal guidance on how to determine whether an 
injury is in fact “concrete.” The Court stated that to be a concrete injury, 
the injury must be “‘de facto,’ that is, it must actually exist.”20 
To determine whether the injury actually exists, Spokeo provided two 
inquiries for the lower courts to consider.21 First, the Court says that “it is 
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 
basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”22 This instruction seems 
simple enough: compare the injury in the present case to one which would 
have been actionable when Article III’s case or controversy requirement 
came into effect.23 The second instruction deals with Congress’ judgment 
regarding whether a particular intangible harm is enough to satisfy the 
confines of Article III.24 Essentially the Court provides that the statutory 
text itself must contain more than just a private cause of action and a 
                                                                                                         
16 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (2010). (“The Federal Trade Commission shall be authorized 
to enforce compliance with the requirements imposed by this subchapter under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 41 et. seq.), with respect to consumer reporting 
agencies and all other persons subject thereto . . . .”). 
17 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1554; 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2008); 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2004). 
18 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012). 
19 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545. 
20 Id. at 1548. 
21 Id. at 1549. 
22 Id. 
23 Tim Day, The Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins Decision and its Impact on Privacy, U.S. 
CHAMBER (July 22, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/article/the-spokeo-inc-
v-robins-decision-and-its-impact-privacy. 
24 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
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statutory damages provision; this is evidenced by the fact that Robins was 
unable to sufficiently allege a concrete injury to fulfill Article III’s 
standing requirement.25 
Spokeo is the first Supreme Court case to separate the “concrete and 
particularized” prongs.26 The Court notes that the “risk of real harm” can 
satisfy the concreteness prong, but the Court does not explain beyond that 
what risk of real harm will count moving forward.27 By attaching to the 
meaning of “concrete” ideas that were always thought to be a part of the 
“concrete and particularized” analysis, the Court provides more questions 
than answers in determining what will actually constitute a “concrete” 
harm. 
III. ARTICLE III 
A.     Standing: Requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
Article III, Section 2 contains what is commonly known as the “case 
or controversy requirement.”28 This requirement “limits the exercise of 
judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”29 In relevant part, Article 
III, Section 2 states: 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and 
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their authority . . . between citizens of different 
states . . . between citizens of the same state claiming 
lands under grants of different states, and between a state, 
or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or 
subjects.30 
                                                                                                         
25 See id. at 1550 (“In the context of this particular case, these general principles tell us 
two things: On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false 
information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk. On the other hand, 
Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation.”); 
see also Day, supra note 23. 
26 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion 
observes that time and time again, our decisions have coupled the words ‘concrete and 
particularized.’ True, but true too, in the four cases cited by the Court, and many others, 
opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms ‘concrete’ and ‘particularized.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
27 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
28 Id. 
29 Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937). 
30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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Article III also requires the plaintiff to allege, at an irreducible minimum, 
“(1) an injury that is (2) ‘fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct’ and that is (3) ‘likely to be redressed by the requested 
relief.’”31 Whether a lawsuit is brought by an individual or as a class 
action, as was the case in Spokeo, the Constitution mandates that the 
plaintiff have standing.32 
Beyond the minimum articulated in Lujan, the Court has also 
implemented additional requirements into the Article III standing inquiry. 
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff’s complaint must “fall within 
‘the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guarantee in question.’”33 A causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of must be fairly traceable to the action 
being challenged by the plaintiff and not a result of the independent action 
of some third party who is not before the court.34 It also must be likely, not 
merely speculative, that a favorable decision will redress the injury.35 It is 
not exactly clear, however, what level of “speculation” the Court requires 
since the Court has previously allowed the risk of future harm to qualify 
as an injury for standing purposes.36 Beyond these requirements, 
“[p]articularization is [also] necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is 
not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’”37 
B.     Standing Requirements in the Class Action Context 
In a class action, there is one or more named plaintiffs representing a 
large group of similarly situated people.38 At a minimum, the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs who are named in a class action must show that they have some 
personal stake in the outcome of the case, not that the unnamed class 
                                                                                                         
31 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
32 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
33 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). 
34 Id. at 491. 
35 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
36 See Krottner v. Starbucks, Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (After a 
company computer containing unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers 
of roughly 97,000 employees was stolen from Starbucks, Starbucks sent a letter to affected 
employees which asked employees to monitor their financial accounts carefully and that 
Starbucks would be having a credit watch company monitor credit for a year for those 
affected. The Court found that because there was a credible threat of harm before the actual 
harm had occurred—which would have been the use of this secure information—plaintiffs 
had standing under Article III). 
37 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
38 See e.g., Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 167–68 (1989). 
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members have necessarily suffered the alleged injury. 39 While there is no 
magic number for the number of plaintiffs in a class action, essentially, for 
every named defendant, at least one named plaintiff must be able to assert 
a claim directly against that defendant, and it is at that point that Article 
III standing is satisfied. All named plaintiffs must allege and show that 
they have personally been injured.40 If any of the named class 
representative plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite case or controversy, 
then no plaintiff representative can seek redress on behalf of himself or on 
behalf of any of the class members.41 
C.     Particularized and Concrete: “Real” and Not “Abstract” 
To establish a “concrete” injury in fact, the plaintiff must show “the 
reality of an injury, harm that is real, not abstract, but not necessarily 
tangible.”42 Injury in fact encompasses the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing” and refers to “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . ; and (b) ‘actual or 
imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical[.] . . . ‘”43 “Real” is defined 
as “not artificial,” “genuine,” and “not imaginary.”44 Conversely, 
“abstract” is defined as “considered apart from a particular instance.”45 
Even in its simplest form, “concrete” derives its definition from these two 
terms. Simply stated, concrete refers to something that is both not 
imaginary and a part of a particular instance.46 
Concrete and particularized are a conjugation of sorts. Courts that 
have decided Article III standing issues have time and time again coupled 
the two words together.47 However, Spokeo goes against the grain as the 
                                                                                                         
39 Hidalgo v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 148 F. Supp. 3d 285, 292 (S.D. N.Y. 
2015). 
40 Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 193, 198 (D.D.C. 2016); see also In re Sony 
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 956 (S.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“In a class action context, named plaintiffs representing a class ‘must allege 
and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, 
unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to 
represent . . . .’ ‘[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class established 
the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf 
of himself or any other members of the class.’”) (citations omitted). 
41 See Sony, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 956. 
42 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555–56. 
43 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
44 Real, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
45 Abstract, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
46 See e.g., Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540; see also, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
47 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555 (“[T]hey have suffered an injury in fact, i.e., a concrete 
and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest.”); see also 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (“As we have explained in our prior opinions, the injury–in–
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first Supreme Court case to view the concrete and particularized 
requirement as two separate requirements.48 It is here that it becomes quite 
unclear who actually gets to decide whether an injury has occurred. An 
incorrect zip code, which may be insignificant on its face, can amount to 
a concrete injury because of the amount of information that can be inferred 
about a person based on their geographical location, including guesses 
about a person’s wealth or demographic information, which are both 
factors that could hinder the ability to obtain a job.49 
D.     Statutory Violations under Article III 
Congress has the authority to create new, individualized rights and 
remedies for a violation of those rights, but Congress does not have the 
authority to allow plaintiffs to bring forth generalized grievances on behalf 
of the public as a whole. Standing to sue for statutory damages requires 
that the plaintiff suffer a personal, individualized violation of a statutory 
right.50 For example, imagine a statute requiring that all tax return forms 
be printed on blue paper. The statutory remedy for a violation of the statute 
is a penalty of $500. An individual receives a white tax form in violation 
of this statute. It has not affected the individual’s ability to fill out the 
forms, but it is an individualized injury. However, this violation is nothing 
more than a bare procedural violation. Although a statutory remedy is 
provided, the injury is not concrete because the ability to fill out the tax 
form is no different for a blue form than it is for a white one. 
The Spokeo court acknowledged that a “bare procedural violation” 
was not enough to confer standing upon Robins.51 However, the Court 
provided little guidance to lower courts, now bound by this decision, in 
assessing whether an injury in fact is indeed concrete. Standing for injuries 
stemming from a procedural violation “turn on whether the underlying 
                                                                                                         
fact requirement requires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both ‘concrete and 
particularized.’”) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. at 180–81 (2000)). 
48 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion 
observes that time and time again, our decisions have coupled the words ‘concrete and 
particularized.’ True, but true too, in the four cases cited by the Court, and many others, 
opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms ‘concrete’ and ‘particularized.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
49 See id. at 1550; see also Daniel Solove, When Is a Person Harmed by a Privacy 
Violation? Thoughts on Spokeo v. Robins, TEACHPRIVACY (May 17, 2016), 
https://www.teachprivacy.com/thoughts-on-spokeo-v-robins. 
50 Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 3, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13–1339). 
51 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
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interest protected by the procedure is concrete, not on whether the failure 
to follow the procedure is itself an individual injury to the plaintiff.”52 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A.     Who Decides Who Has Suffered an Injury? 
Clearly, Article III mandates that a plaintiff must have suffered some 
form of injury.53 What is less clear, however, is “whether the Court should 
accept an injury Congress defines via statute as sufficient for constitutional 
purposes.”54 A plaintiff who wishes to adjudicate his injury, vested upon 
him by statute, need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of that 
right conferred upon him.55 Accordingly, is it Congress or the Court who 
decides who has suffered an injury? 
Spokeo points out that Congress is authorized to articulate which 
intangible harms qualify as meeting the irreducible constitutional 
minimum set forth in Article III. Congress is also able to “elevate to the 
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were 
previously inadequate in law.”56 However, Spokeo does not indicate 
whether it is Congress or the Court that gets to decide whether or not 
standing exists in any given case. In consumer protection cases, one might 
think that Congress defines when a plaintiff has standing through the 
enactment of consumer protection statutes, but Spokeo goes against this 
notion, stating that the Ninth Circuit failed to conduct an adequate injury 
in fact analysis, and remanding the case even though there is a 
Congressional remedy provided by the FCRA.57 
According to Spokeo, the dissemination of false information, leading 
to lost opportunity and the inability to obtain a job, does not rise to the 
                                                                                                         
52 Christopher T. Burt, Comments, Procedural Injury Standing after Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 297 (1995) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1995)); 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 297 note 102 (“If the standing inquiry looked to 
whether the procedural violation was itself a concrete injury, procedural plaintiffs would 
never have standing because ‘every citizen’s interest in [the] proper application of the 
Constitution and laws’ is not a concrete interest . . . .”)). 
53 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
54 Daniel Townsend, Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. Online 76, 77 (2016). 
55 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1553. 
56 Id. at 1549. 
57 Id. at 1550 (“Because the Ninth Circuit failed to fully appreciate the distinction 
between concreteness and particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete. It did not 
address the question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the particular procedural 
violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness 
requirement.”). 
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level of injury required to satisfy the “concreteness” prong of injury in 
fact.58 However, Spokeo is inconsistent with other cases that have analyzed 
violations of consumer protection statutes. For example, in In re Sony 
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,59 the court found 
that the injury alleged sufficiently showed the risk of a future harm where 
no immediate harm was apparent. Sony was a consumer data breach case 
whereby a class action was filed against multiple Sony companies.60 The 
class alleged that Sony and its subsidiaries failed to protect its customers’ 
personal and financial information, creating a foreseeable future injury.61 
This foreseeable injury, according to the court, was that hackers could gain 
access to millions of Sony customers’ personal information, including 
names, addresses, emails, birthdays, credit and debit information, 
usernames, and passwords.62 Sony argued that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing against all defendants, and as to two Sony subsidiaries, Sony 
Online Entertainment, LLC (“SOE”) and Sony Corporation of America 
(“SCA”), plaintiffs did not have standing because plaintiffs failed to 
adequately show any cognizable relationship between Sony and the 
subsidiaries.63 Sony proceeded to argue that plaintiffs lacked standing as 
to all defendants, but the court found that the plaintiffs had articulated 
enough of a particularized and concrete injury, even though no harm had 
yet occurred, because the plaintiffs had pled enough of a risk of future 
harm and a “causal connection” between the “alleged misconduct and a 
legally protected interest.”64 
The risk of future harm alone can be enough to satisfy the standing 
requirements. The Sony court found that where the plaintiffs alleged that 
personal information had been stolen, though not yet used by the thieves, 
the plaintiffs “articulated sufficient particularized and concrete harm” to 
satisfy the injury in fact requirement—at least at that particular point in 
the pleadings.65 Relying on Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,66 the Sony court 
found that the stolen information was susceptible to an increased risk of 
future harm and although no harm had yet occurred, “future harm may be 
regarded as a cognizable loss sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury–in–
fact requirement.”67 Krottner involved the theft of a Starbucks laptop, 
                                                                                                         
58 See id. 
59 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 958 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
60 Id. at 950. 
61 See id. at 951–52. 
62 Id. at 950–51. 
63 See id. at 956–57. 
64 See id. at 957–59. 
65 Sony, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 958. 
66 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
67 Sony, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (“A plaintiff may allege a future injury in order to comply 
with [the injury–in–fact] requirement, but only if he or she ‘is immediately in danger of 
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which contained unencrypted names, addresses, and social security 
numbers of almost 100,000 employees, from one of its stores.68 Although 
the stolen information had not yet been misused, the Krottner court found 
that the risk of future harm was enough of an injury to warrant conferring 
Article III standing upon plaintiffs.69 Essentially, the idea was that if the 
plaintiff in Krottner could anticipate a greater level of harm, the plaintiff 
would not lose standing.70 
B.     Consumer Protection 
The FTC is responsible for protecting consumers by preventing unfair, 
deceptive, or fraudulent practices in the marketplace.71 The FTC conducts 
investigations into consumer protection, filing lawsuits against those who 
violate the law; develops rules to ensure a stimulated marketplace; and 
educates consumers and businesses about their rights and 
responsibilities.72 Indeed, the FTC and the Bureau of Consumer Protection 
set out to, simply put, “protect America’s consumers.”73 
The FCRA was meant to give consumers the opportunity to seek 
redress upon a violation of it.74 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her 
dissent, under the FCRA, “Congress granted adversely affected consumers 
a right to sue noncomplying reporting agencies.”75 The purpose of the 
FCRA is to require consumer reporting agencies to be fair in their 
reporting of individuals concerning “the confidentiality, accuracy, 
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information . . . .”76 Congress 
                                                                                                         
sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged . . . conduct and the injury or 
threat of injury is both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Krottner v. Starbucks, 641 U.S. 95, 102 (1983))). 
68 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1140. 
69 Id. at 1142–43. 
70 Id. at 1143 (“As many of our sister circuits have noted, the injury–in–fact requirement 
can be satisfied by a threat of future harm tor by an act which harms the plaintiff only by 
increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the 
defendant’s actions . . . . Once the plaintiffs’ allegations establish at least this level of 
injury, the fact that the plaintiffs anticipate that some greater potential harm might follow 
the defendant’s act does not affect the standing inquiry.” (quoting Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l 
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007))). 
71 FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
72 What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
73 FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftv.gov (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012). 
75 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1554 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 15 
U.S.C. § 1681n (2012) (willful noncompliance); 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2012) (negligent 
noncompliance). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012). 
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clearly intended for there to be redressability for those consumers who fall 
victim to a violation of the FCRA. 
Because of the decision in Spokeo, consumer protection and privacy 
law cases, which already prove difficult to demonstrate an injury–in–fact, 
are “now [becoming] increasingly unclear as to what level of harm will 
constitute ‘concrete injury.’”77 Courts are already applying the Spokeo 
holding and individuals and entities keeping up with the decisions are 
starting to see exactly how little guidance was given in terms of defining 
a “concrete injury.” Essentially, Spokeo indicates that consumers will lose 
the ability to bring suit against companies. This is especially problematic 
in an ever–growing technological world because privacy has become a 
major concern amongst consumers, and many statutes designed to protect 
consumer privacy can become obsolete if the decision in Spokeo is not 
addressed again soon. Plaintiffs now need to show that they have suffered 
“‘real’ concrete harm, or [face] a ‘certainly impending’ risk that concrete 
harm will occur.”78 
C.     Before Spokeo 
In 1992, the Court held that “[t]he . . . injury required by Article III 
standing may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing.’”79 Since Lujan, whether a purely 
statutory violation could, by itself, create an injury–in–fact for standing 
purposes, has seemingly split the federal circuits.80 
Where the FTC seeks to protect consumer rights, Spokeo goes against 
that very ideal. Now, even where a plaintiff possesses a personal stake in 
the outcome of the case and the injury is particularized, the “concrete” 
requirement seems hazy at best. Plaintiffs will be deterred from brining 
                                                                                                         
77 John Phillips, Behnam Dayim, Sean D. Unger, & Dae Ho Lee, Spokeo and Article III 
Standing: You May Be Particularized But Are You Concrete?, PAUL HASTINGS (May 26, 
2016), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details?id=4b6ce969-2334-6428
-811c-ff00004cbded [hereinafter “Paul Hastings”]. 
78 Day, supra note 23 (Plaintiffs now bringing the “no injury” type claims such as in 
Spokeo, where the injury was that Robins had false information about him disseminated 
that would make it difficult to obtain a job (i.e., a future injury), the requirement that 
plaintiffs show they have suffered a “real” concrete injury “will be impossible for plaintiffs 
to satisfy in the cases formerly brought a ‘no injury’ class actions – particularly those in 
which the claim is that personal information has been collected or retained in a manner 
inconsistent with statutory requirements, but has not been disseminated to a third party.”). 
79 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). 
80 Compare, e.g., Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Because [the act] gives Plaintiff a statutory cause of action, we hold that Plaintiff has 
standing to pursue her claims against Defendants.”), with David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 
338–39 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that a statutory injury is not sufficient to satisfy Article III 
standing requirements). 
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suit and spending money on litigation because they will be unsure of 
whether the fact that, even though a statute calls for redress when there is 
a violation, they must show more than that “bare procedural violation” to 
prove that their injury meets the concrete prong of the injury in fact test.81 
D.     Spokeo’s Impact 
There have been many consumer protection cases litigated since the 
Spokeo decision and many are either the result of a violation of the FCRA, 
or a violation of either (1) the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, 
(2) the Fait Debt Collection Practices Act, or (3) the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act. 
Many of the statutory violations courts are seeing now are consumer 
protection statutes dealing with privacy. In a recent case, a health insurer, 
CareFirst, experienced a massive data breach and over 1 million 
policyholders had their information stolen.82 The information at issue 
consisted of names, birth dates, email addresses, and subscriber 
identification numbers.83 Those who had their information stolen filed suit 
alleging that CareFirst had failed to adequately safeguard their personal 
information.84 Like the Supreme Court in Spokeo, the Attias court found 
that the plaintiffs had not suffered any “concrete” injury as a result of 
having this information stolen,85 even though having such personal 
information creates a real and immediate risk of future harm, much like 
the harm suffered in Sony. 
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) is another 
consumer protection statute that Spokeo has influenced.86 Whenever a 
credit card is swiped, the receipt usually contains four or five digits on it 
preceded by several Xs. FACTA, an amendment to the FCRA, is 
responsible for ensuring that, among other things, “no person that accepts 
credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of a business shall print more 
than the last five digits of the card number . . . .”87 FACTA has also caused 
a split amongst the circuits with at least three FACTA cases finding that 
                                                                                                         
81 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016). 
82 Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 193, 197 (D.D.C. 2016), rev’d, 865 F.3d 620 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 203. 
86 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–159, 117 Stat. 
1952 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1681 (2000)). 
87 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2012); see also Ezra D. Church, Christina M. Vitale, 
Kenneth M. Kliebard, and Brian M. Ercole, Spokeo 6 Months Later: An Undeniably 
Dramatic Impact, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/
869153/spokeo-6-months-later-an-undeniably-dramatic-impact. 
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plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient injury to satisfy the standing 
requirement88 and at least three finding that plaintiffs did not allege a 
sufficient injury to satisfy the standing requirement.89 
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)90 deals with 
notice, timing, and various other requirements on debt collectors.91 The 
FDCPA is meant to protect consumers from abusive debt collection 
practices.92 In this facet of consumer protection law, the courts consistently 
find that plaintiffs did allege sufficient injury to confer standing upon 
them.93 Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., a leading case decided by the 
Eleventh Circuit, heavily involves the FDCPA.94 Ms. Mahala Church had 
alleged that Accretive Health sent her a letter advising her that she owed a 
debt to the hospital, but in doing so, failed to include certain disclosures 
required by the FDCPA.95 While Accretive Health argued that the injury 
that Church suffered was not sufficient for Article III standing purposes, 
                                                                                                         
88 See Flaum v. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(finding that because the plaintiff had “personally suffered a concrete harm in receiving a 
receipt that violated this statute, [he] has sufficiently alleged an injury–in–fact”); see also 
Wood v. J Choo USA, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (“Because 
[Plaintiff] suffered a concrete harm as soon as [Defendant] printed the offending receipt, 
the Complaint alleges an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing.”) (citations omitted); 
see also Guarisma v. Microsoft, Corp., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1266 (S.D. Fla 2016) 
(“Congress gave consumers the legal right to obtain a receipt at the point of sale showing 
no more than the last five digits of the consumer’s credit or debit card number . . . . Thus, 
we conclude that appellants have alleged an injury–in–fact sufficient to confer Article III 
standing.” (quoting Hammer v. Sam’s E., Inc., 754 F.3d 492, 498–99 (8th Cir.2014))). 
89 See Stelmachers v. Verifone Sys., Inc., No. 5:14–cv–04912–EJD, 2016 WL 6835084 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“While it is true that under certain conditions an increased risk of 
identity theft can constitute a concrete, ‘certainly impending’ harm, those conditions have 
not been alleged in this case . . . . Thus, . . . the risk that Plaintiff will be subjected to the 
type of “low tech” identity theft identified . . . is too attenuated to constitute a qualifying 
injury in fact for standing . . . .”) (citation omitted)); see also Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 
No. 2:15–0190 (WJM), 2016 WL 6133827, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016) (“But ‘Congress’ 
role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff 
automatically satisfies the injury–in–fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a 
statutory right . . . [.]’”) (omission in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 
1540, 1549 (2016))); see also id. at *3 (“printing first six and last four digits amounts to 
‘purely procedural violation’ of FACTA and does not constitute an injury–in–fact.” 
(quoting Thompson v. Rally House of Kansas City et. al., 15–cv–008860GAF, slip op., at 
*9 (W.D. Mo. 2016)). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 1692–1692p (2012). 
91 See Ezra D. Church, Christina M. Vitale, Kenneth M. Kliebard, and Brian M. Ercole, 
Spokeo 6 Months Later: An Undeniably Dramatic Impact, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/869153/spokeo-6-months-later-an-
undeniably-dramatic-impact [hereinafter “Law360”]. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 654 F. App’x 990 (11th Cir. 2016). 
95 Id. at 991. 
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the court found that, where Church alleged that the FDCPA governed the 
letter she received, there existed a right to the disclosures required by the 
statute.96 Furthermore, the Court stated that “Church has sufficiently 
alleged that she has sustained a concrete—i.e., ‘real’—injury because she 
did not receive the allegedly required disclosures.”97 
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) is yet another 
consumer protection statute that Spokeo is impacting.98 In Mey v. Got 
Warranty, Inc., consumers were receiving unwanted telephone calls in 
violation of the TCPA.99 The TCPA was enacted by Congress to protect 
consumers from harassment and has become one of the most litigated 
privacy–related statutes of the last decade—an unsurprising fact given the 
ever–increasing technological advancements, particularly in the 
“smartphone” sector. The TCPA regulates how marketers may contact 
consumers by fax, telephone, or text message without the recipient’s 
consent.100 In Mey, the court found that a concrete injury existed because 
consumers with pre–paid cell phones would lose minutes, the battery life 
of their cell phones would drain, and they would have to pay for electricity 
to ensure that their cell phones were charged.101 
The iPhone, the most popular smartphone sold in the United States,102 
costs about twenty–five cents per year to charge.103 In Mey, the court said 
that this was enough of an injury to confer Article III standing. The current 
federal minimum wage in the United States is $7.25/hour.104 Working a 
forty–hour workweek at minimum wage amounts to a gross income of 
$15,080, assuming no time is taken off.105 The disconnect between Mey 
and Spokeo, then, is absurd. On the one hand, Mey says that a quarter’s 
worth of damage, yearly, is enough to confer standing upon a plaintiff. On 
                                                                                                         
96 Id. at 991, 995. 
97 Id. at 995. 
98 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2012). 
99 See e.g., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 644–46 (N.D.W. Va. 2016). 
100 Law360, supra note 91. 
101 See Mey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 644–45. 
102 Ben Lovejoy, iPhone 6s best–selling smartphone both in U.S. & worldwide, iPhone 
SE #3 in U.S., 9TO5MAC (Sep. 6, 2016), https://9to5mac.com/2016/09/06/iphone-sales-
kantar-strategy-analytics/ (affirming that the iPhone has an 11% market share); Number of 
iPhone users in the United States from 2012 to 2016, STATISTA, https://www.statista.
com/statistics/232790/forecast-of-apple-users-in-the-us/ (asserting that the number of 
iPhones currently in use by United States consumers is roughly 90.1 million) (last visited 
Dec. 2016). 
103 Mobile phone: 25 cents per year, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
pictures/ekhf45ffjkj/mobile-phone-25-cents-p/#111b9817666b (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) 
(source of information: Electric Power Research Institute, Apple). 
104 Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/
minimumwage (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
105 $7.25 x 40–hour workweek x 52 weeks. 
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the other hand, Robins, who was unable to obtain a full–time job, 
effectively lost out on a minimum of $15,080. 
Spokeo seemingly goes against the notion of consumer protection and 
creates new barriers that the FTC must overcome. Where it used to be that 
“concrete and particularized” were analyzed together, it appears that 
Spokeo has bifurcated that test, requiring “concrete” and “particularized” 
to each be analyzed independently.106 Now, where an injury in fact 
seemingly exists, the Court can objectively decide if such injury does in 
fact rise to the level required to be both concrete and particularized. This 
is a dangerous road to follow because consumers will face immense 
struggles demonstrating injury, especially in cases where the statutes put 
in place to protect them have been violated, leaving the injured consumer 
with little chance of receiving redress. 
The fact that courts cannot seem to decide whether an injury is 
“concrete” and sufficiently “real” to warrant conferring standing on 
plaintiffs demonstrates Spokeo’s lack of clarity. The cases that Spokeo has 
already impacted are inconsistent with each other. Where one court says 
that an injury exists, another says the injury is insufficient. 
E.     The New Standard: Who Suffers? 
What Spokeo seems to indicate is that if the Court wants to elevate an 
injury to a level deemed concrete for standing purposes, it will, and if the 
Court does not want to elevate an injury to the requisite level of 
concreteness, it will not. Corporations and agencies that violate consumer 
protection statutes seemingly now possess much more leeway in cases like 
Spokeo. Where a federal statute has been violated, resulting in injury to 
one or more plaintiffs, in the post–Spokeo world, the court will rarely find 
that a procedural violation rises to the level of a concrete injury. It used to 
be that where a plaintiff could show that he or she had suffered an injury 
that was real, not just hypothetical, the plaintiffs had standing; now, the 
pleadings themselves undoubtedly will face much heavier scrutiny. In a 
world where plaintiffs already have enough trouble bringing suit under 
federal statutory violations, the threshold for what is deemed an injury is 
now much higher.107 “Spokeo [can significantly] [a]ffect plaintiffs’ ability 
to bring suits based on privacy harms.”108 
Robins sought redress for the jobs he could have had, as well as for 
the dissemination of false information.109 While it is unknown whether 
Robins would have even been hired for those jobs, the fact that he was not 
                                                                                                         
106 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545. 
107 See Paul Hastings, supra note 77. 
108 Id. 
109 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1556 (2016). 
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even qualified to interview for them should have been enough for an 
injury–in–fact to exist. The Ninth Circuit concluded that concrete injury 
existed where Robins “alleged[d] that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, 
not just the statutory rights of other people . . . [and] ‘Robins’ personal 
interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized rather 
than collective.’”110 Robins’ injury was particularized in that obtaining a 
favorable judgment benefited him much more than the public at large. Had 
the effect of a judgment been undifferentiated from the rest of the public, 
then the claim would be nothing more than a generalized grievance and 
Robins would not have Article III standing because there is no standing 
for generalized grievances.111 
Because of the misinformation disseminated by Spokeo, Robins was 
directly affected. Robins sought to remedy the dissemination of 
information specifically about him and the negative effect it had on his 
ability to obtain a job. Justice Ginsburg touches on this point, noting that 
the concreteness requirement “refers to the reality of an injury, harm that 
is real, not abstract, but not necessarily tangible.”112 This information 
about Robins, which was false, “made him appear overqualified for jobs 
he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers would 
be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities.”113 
This incorrect information, then, “cause[d] actual harm to [Robins’] 
employment prospects.”114 
While Robins was unable to point to specific employers considering 
him for employment, the injury he suffered was concrete because it was a 
real and direct violation of the FCRA. The Court relied on the “bare 
procedural violation” language and found that there was no harm, i.e., “an 
incorrect zip code,” but Justice Ginsburg in her dissent points out that 
Robins’ injury amounts to much more than a mere procedural violation: 
“Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins complains of misinformation 
about his education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate 
representations that could affect his fortune in the job market.”115 
Although Justice Ginsburg uses the word “could,” the lost opportunity in 
and of itself may constitute injury.116 The FCRA was designed to prevent 
                                                                                                         
110 Id. at 1546. 
111 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (“This is surely . . . a 
generalized grievance . . . since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and ‘common 
to all members of the public.’”) (citations omitted). 
112 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555–56. 
113 Id. at 1554. 
114 Id. at 1554, 1556. 
115 Id. at 1550, 1556. 
116 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.4 (3d ed. 2008) (updated Jan. 2017); Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1556 (“ . . . inaccurate representations that could affect his fortune in the job market.”). 
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such lost opportunity. Even though Spokeo is a private entity, it is bound 
to uphold the procedural obligations imposed by the FCRA. 
F.     What’s Next? 
Besides the FCRA, seventy–two other federal consumer protection 
statutes are currently in effect, including the Clayton Act117 and the Do–
Not–Call Registry Legislation,118 as well as a Bill entitled the Personal 
Data Notification and Protection Act of 2015.119 These statutes and their 
intent to protect consumers are now in danger of becoming obsolete and, 
in that regard, Spokeo amounts to a victory for companies—most notably, 
companies that handle consumer data.120 
Spokeo will likely have a significant impact on cases involving data 
breaches. Many plaintiffs in lawsuits dealing with data breaches derive 
standing from the violation of a federal or state statute.121 Spokeo will 
significantly limit whether a plaintiff will have standing to sue. Claims 
will be dismissed and the pleadings will likely take unnecessarily long 
because plaintiffs who wish to invoke federal jurisdiction bear the burden, 
at the pleading stage, to “‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each 
element” of Article III standing.122 Even if the plaintiff does not initially 
survive the pleading stage, depending on the facts of each individual case, 
it may later be found that the harms alleged do, in fact, amount to the 
requisite level of harm required if pled properly in amended complaints.123 
Unfortunately, while consumers have all of this so–called protection, 
most consumers often do not appreciate how much protection is actually 
afforded to them or how much they are unknowingly relying upon the 
statutes designed to shield them from harm. Not only was Robins denied 
standing, but the class of similarly situated people he was representing was 
also denied a right to redress.124 The Court essentially follows the rationale 
asserted by Spokeo that Congress cannot create standing where the 
Supreme Court says standing does not exist; however, the Court does so 
without explaining why or how it reaches its decision and how the lower 
                                                                                                         
117 15 U.S.C. §§ 15–27 (2012). 
118 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–6155 (2012). 
119 H.R. 1704, 114th Cong. (2015). 
120 Jeff John Roberts, Supreme Court Rejects Privacy Claim in Data Broker Case, 
FORTUNE (May 16, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/16/supreme-court-spokeo-decision/. 
121 Jeryn Crabb, Data–Breach Class Actions Feel the Effects of “Spokeo v. Robins”, 
(July 1, 2016) https://wlflegalpulse.com/2016/07/01/data-breach-class-actions-feel-the-
effects-of-spokeo-v-robins/. 
122 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
123 See, e.g., Paul Hastings, supra note 77. 
124 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
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courts should go about determining whether the injury that Robins alleged 
met the concrete requirement. 
With this decision, one that the Court should have made a direct ruling 
on rather than remanding to the Ninth Circuit, the Court took “no position” 
on the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit that Robins had indeed 
adequately alleged an injury in fact.125 All this has done is lead to 
confusion and chaos amongst the lower courts. Without any “concrete” 
decision to follow, the split between the lower courts on the interpretation 
of consumer protection statutes is going to continue to grow, and until 
Spokeo is revisited by the Supreme Court, which seems likely at this point, 
consumers who have their rights violated may not have any remedies 
available to them. 
After conducting a more thorough analysis of the “concrete” injury 
requirement, the Ninth Circuit found that the injury alleged poses a real 
harm. Accordingly, the Supreme Court can expect to see another petition, 
which hopefully the Court will take, allowing it to render a “concrete” 
decision to help guide the lower courts. In the interim, however, courts are 
left to interpret the Spokeo decision, and consumers will not be afforded 
the protection that Congress intended for them to have. Indeed, as can 
already be seen, where consumer protection statutes are at issue, courts 
applying Spokeo are split on whether a concrete injury exists, and it is 
entirely possible that the future of consumer protection cases hinges on 
which court a plaintiff decides to bring suit in because of how courts 
interpret the statutory language. 
Congress should decide when an injury in fact exists in cases where a 
consumer protection statute has been violated. After all, Congress’ intent 
is to have the statutes enforced; otherwise, why would Congress enact 
them in the first place? “Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination 
of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that 
risk.”126 It should not be up to the courts to decide whether, in a consumer 
protection case, a “bare procedural violation” should negate a plaintiff’s 
standing when that “bare procedural violation” is exactly what Congress 
intended to prevent by virtue of an enacted statute. While it does not 
happen often, Congress does have the ability to “overrule” the Supreme 
Court, or at least negate decisions, when the Court has interpreted a statute 
in a way that Congress did not intend.127 For example, in 1991, Congress 
passed a new Civil Rights Act that overruled at least five Supreme Court 
cases, which were decided in 1989.128 
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Furthermore, allowing Congress to define injuries ensures that the 
statutes are enforced in accordance with the purpose that they are intended 
to serve. If Congress is allowed to decide what satisfies the injury 
requirement in this way, “then the judicial task is simply to determine 
whether the requirements laid out via statute were met.”129 Arguing against 
this notion, Spokeo, Inc. essentially asks the court to hold that “in order 
for an injury to be judicially cognizable, the legal injury must correspond 
to some existing harm that the court can point to outside of the statute’s 
terms.”130 
G.     Can Anything be Done? 
Even if Congress does not act, there remains a chance that the 
Supreme Court will revisit Spokeo. While the Supreme Court is unlikely 
to overrule itself, it could—and should—clarify its decision in such a way 
to invite the lower courts to follow set guidelines in determining whether 
an injury in fact exists, which in turn will expand consumer protection, 
rather than limit it. 
Upon granting certiorari in a pending case, the Court will be able to 
clarify the issues that the lower courts have split on. For example, where 
some courts say a violation of FACTA is a sufficient injury to confer 
standing upon plaintiffs, other courts say that a violation of FACTA 
amounts to a bare procedural violation and therefore does not constitute a 
sufficient injury to satisfy the “concreteness” requirement of standing.131 
There are too many inconsistencies following Spokeo, and they need to be 
cleared up as quickly as possible before consumer suits are essentially 
swept under the rug. If the inconsistencies are not cleared up, the lower 
courts are going to continue in a downward spiral until the Supreme Court 
revisits the issue and clarifies its decision. 
H.     The Ninth Circuit, on Remand 
Since 2016, Courts have been struggling to extrapolate guidance from 
the Spokeo decision as it relates to the determination of when a concrete 
injury exists. On August 15, 2017, more than one year after the Supreme 
Court’s Spokeo decision, the Ninth Circuit articulated an answer to the 
question of whether Robins had sufficiently pled a concrete injury to 
satisfy Article III standing.132 On remand, Judge O’Scannlain, writing for 
the Ninth Circuit, considers the Supreme Court’s first inquiry whereby the 
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lower courts should compare the alleged injury in the present case with 
one that would have been actionable when Article III’s case or controversy 
requirement came into effect.133 However, Judge O’Scannlain notes that 
differences between the FCRA’s cause of action and those recognized at 
common law are not the basis for the inquiry; rather, the relevant point is 
that “Congress has chosen to protect against a harm that is at least closely 
similar in kind to others that have traditionally served as the basis for 
lawsuit.”134 Because the FCRA’s procedures at issue in the case were 
crafted specifically to protect consumers’ concrete interest in accurate 
credit reporting about themselves, the Ninth Circuit was satisfied that the 
alleged harm was enough for Robins to have Article III Standing and to 
pursue a claim against Spokeo, Inc.135 
Once the Ninth Circuit determined that there was a concrete interest 
in the claim, Judge O’Scannlain then answered the question of whether or 
not Robins alleged FCRA violations that created an actual harm rather than 
a “bare procedural violation.”136 Because of Spokeo’s alleged violations 
of the FCRA, particularly 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b),137 Robins’ allegations that 
Spokeo did not ensure the accuracy of his consumer report, all Robins will 
have to show is that Spokeo did in fact prepare a report that contained 
inaccurate information about him.138 Robins, according to the Ninth 
Circuit, not only alleged that Spokeo had prepared such a report, but that 
it also published it on the Internet, thus “clearly implicat[ing]” Robins’ 
concrete interests in truthful credit reporting.139 However, not every 
inaccuracy on a reporting is necessarily enough to provide sufficient basis 
for bringing a lawsuit.140 There must be “some examination of the nature 
of the specific alleged reporting inaccuracies” and that examination must 
raise a risk of real harm to the concrete interests that the FCRA has 
provided to consumers.141 
In Spokeo, Robins alleged that the inaccuracies in his credit report 
were harming his chance of employment and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
bluntly states that “Spokeo’s misinformation ‘cause[s] actual harm to [his] 
                                                                                                         
133 Id. at 1115. 
134 Id. 
135 See id. 
136 Id. 
137 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency 
prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum 
possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report 
relates.” 
138 See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017). 
139 Id. 
140 See id.; Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (providing that an 
incorrectly disseminated zip code would not be enough to constitute a concrete harm). 
141 Robins, 867 F.3d at 1116. 
92 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:69 
 
employment prospects.’”142 Judge O’Scannlain follows in the footsteps of 
Justice Ginsburg and notes that where Robins claims that the inaccurate 
reports misrepresent information that is relevant to employers, 
subsequently creating mental angst that Robins’ employment prospects are 
diminished, the inaccurate reports could be deemed a real harm.143 Indeed, 
it is further noted that “ensuring the accuracy of this sort of information 
thus seems directly and substantially related to [the] FCRA’s goals.”144 
Accordingly, as Justice Ginsburg argued in the Supreme Court, the Ninth 
Circuit properly held that Robins’ alleged injuries satisfied the 
“concreteness” inquiry.145 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is not entirely clear what the effects of Spokeo will be. The 
separation of “concrete” and “particularized” in Spokeo has caused more 
questions than answers. Now, it will be very difficult for a plaintiff to show 
that the injury they have suffered is “concrete,” especially in the consumer 
protection context where much of the harm involved is a risk of future 
harm.146 Indeed, it is true that having data stolen in a data–breach case does 
present an immediate threat of injury in that personal information can 
easily be misused. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that in the consumer protection arena, 
it should be Congress, through use of the consumer protection statutes, 
that decides what constitutes a “concrete” injury for Article III standing 
purposes. Allowing the courts to decide amongst themselves has already 
proven to be more of a problem than a solution, as evidenced by the 
massive split that is forming in consumer protection case litigation.147 
Because technology is an ever–increasing aspect of our lives, many harms 
that we care about are not necessarily tangible in that there is no physical 
harm, but rather harm that is financial, emotional, etc. For consumers, 
there are only the harms that Congress has defined and even those 
definitions are insufficient. An example is Spokeo itself: a man’s ability to 
receive a job was greatly diminished because of false information 
published about him. 
Consumer protection statutes exist to protect consumers. If a 
consumer alleges that he or she has been injured by a procedural violation 
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of a statute enacted to prevent such misconduct, that plaintiff should have 
Article III standing. The consumer should also have standing under prior 
precedent, which says that even if an injury has not yet been suffered, the 
risk of a real injury is sufficient to establish standing. This note is not to 
say that the analysis for standing is incorrect; rather, it is to show that there 
is a flaw in the Spokeo analysis of the injury–in–fact requirement. 
Spokeo leaves class actions intact but tarnishes the ability of plaintiffs 
to bring private causes of action against companies that have violated state 
and federal consumer protection statutes. Especially in the data–breach 
context, this will prove to be fatal to consumers who wish to file suit 
against the companies that have their personal information stored. It is also 
possible that consumers who feel insecure may no longer store any 
information or may begin trying to avoid online services. While the latter 
is highly unlikely, it might be the best solution in some cases. While class 
actions in general do survive, Spokeo was about harm and what is required 
to allege a sufficient injury to allow the case to proceed through the court 
system. With Spokeo’s lack of clarity, proceeding through the court system 
could prove to be quite difficult for consumers. 
